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Economic theory recognizes the importance of the firm’s balance sheet channel. 
This stands in stark contrast to the neoclassical theory of investment. This paper 
analyses the response of firms to the economic crisis in the sample of Croatian firms. 
Our main variables of interest are investment and employment. We estimated the 
OLS model that accounts for a heterogeneous response to the crisis shock of 
differently leveraged firms. The empirical model is augmented so that it accounts for 
industry and county effects. The robustness checks are performed for different 
dependent as well as control variables and interactions. The results strongly and 
robustly confirm the importance of the firm’s balance sheet channel. 
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Using Croatian firm-level data, this paper investigates to which extent the financial 
and liquidity position contributed to the development of investment and 
employment at the firm-level during the period 2007-10. According to the theory of 
firm`s balance sheet channel, the firm’s response to demand shocks depends on the 
firm’s balance sheet characteristics. Our empirical approach aims at assessing the 
extent to which the firms that were highly leveraged before the crisis reduced 
investment and employment more than firms with lower leverage but otherwise 
similar characteristics. Therefore, the main research questions in this paper are: 1) Did 
the high-debt and/or the low liquid firms experience larger decrease of investment 
and employment during the Great recession?; 2) Are the results sensitive to the 
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The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 gives the literature overview 
and discusses recent developments in the research on the firm balance channel. 
Section 3 describes the data set, the construction of our empirical sample and 
discusses the variables used in the empirical analysis. The methodology and 
empirical model are explained in the Section 4. The Section 5 shows the results and 
the respective discussion. The last chapter concludes. 
 
Literature review 
According to the neoclassical theory of investment, the Tobin 𝑄 (Hayashi, 1982) 
contains the full information about investment dynamics, while financial variables, 
like financial leverage or liquidity don’t have any effect on firm`s investment 
behaviour. Firm’s capital structure is therefore irrelevant (Modigliani, Miller, 1958) and 
capital can freely fly from unproductive to productive agents. This view implies 
perfect capital markets and can be denoted as “irrelevance view” (Schularick, 
Taylor, 2011). 
On the other side, even before financial crisis, some papers argued that business 
cycles dynamics and investment of non-financial firms might also depend on 
financial variables, like firm’s net worth or collateral (Bernanke, Gertler, 1989; 
Carlstrom, Fuerst, 1997; Kiyotaki, Moore, 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist, 1999; Tirole, 
2006). This channel is known as firm’s balance sheet channel or the investment 
channel of financial frictions. In these models, investment is a positive function of the 
firm’s net worth because the greater the net worth of the borrower, the more likely 
she will use self-financing as a way to fund investment. At the same time, higher net 
worth leads to decrease in credit rationing, so firms have easier access to external 
finance. 
Papers that emphasize the role of household's balance sheets or consumption 
channel of financial frictions are Mian and Sufi (2010, 2014), Eggertson and Krugman 
(2012). Some papers point to the role of financial intermediary balance sheets (see, 
Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Gertler, Kiyotaki, 2011; Brunnermeier, Sannikov, 2014). 
Many papers (see Hubbard (1988) and Stein (2003) for the literature survey) 
empirically assess the degree of financial constraints for non-financial firms. This 
literature usually divides firms in three groups according to some balance sheet 
variable i.e. criteria, and then estimates the sensitivity of investment to cash flows for 
every group. The monotonically increasing sensitivity in the balance sheet variable 
than implies that high-debt firms are financially constrained. Fazzari and Petersen 
(1993) were first that apply this approach to find the evidence for financial 
constraints. 
Many authors criticized the investment-cash flow sensitivity approach. Two 
critiques are the most common: 1) endogeneity problem and 2) measurement error 
in Q. The first critique is particularly important because the positive sensitivity of 
investment and cash flows can be a sign of higher investment opportunities, not 
financial constraints. To overcome the endogeneity problem, some authors suggest 
quasi-experimental methods (treatment effects) analysing the existence of 
financially constrained firms (Calomiris, Hubbard, 1995; Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Schleifer, 1994; Lamont, 1997; Rauh, 2006; Almeida et al., 2012; Lemmon, Roberts, 
2010). An alternative approach is to use survey methods (see Campello et al., 2010; 
Šonje, Kukavčić, 2014). The second critique points to the possibility of an upward bias 
in Q. Namely, the estimated coefficient on Q is larger than in standard investment 
regression function (Kaplan, Zingales, 1997; Erickson, Whited, 2000; Gomes, 2001; Alti, 
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Our research builds on the concept of balance sheet recession and is closely 
related to the empirical research of the firm´s balance sheet channel during the crisis 
(Kuchler, 2015; Giroud, Mueller, 2015). According to the theory of balance sheet 
recession, high levels of private sector debt change the objective function of the 
corporate sector from profit maximizing to debt minimizing (paying down debt) that 
cause less spending and economic growth (Koo, 2009). Firms may prefer to reduce 
leverage instead of investing accordingly. On the empirical side, Kuchler (2015) 
confirmed that high-levered firms in Denmark experienced higher decrease in 
investment relative to low-levered firms. Giroud and Mueller (2015) showed that 
establishments of firms that tightened their debt capacity in the run-up to the Great 
Recession (high-leverage firms) exhibit a significantly larger decline in employment in 
response to household demand shocks than low leverage firms. 
 
Data and descriptive evidence 
Our data sample consists of all joint-stock, limited liability and handicraft companies 
in Croatia and is collected from the data repository of Financial Agency (FINA). We 
have almost the full population of firms in the country (N=990.908, T=15) available for 
our empirical analysis. We are interested in tracking firm’s change of investment and 
employment behaviour throughout the economic crisis. The economic crisis 
represents the biggest and longest macroeconomic shock for Croatian firms in the 
last 15 years and we use it as an event that made firms behave in a non-standard 
way. Since we are interested in the firm´s behaviour during the crisis, the period of 
the analysis is from 2007 to 2010. The crisis effects were strongest during that period 
which is confirmed by robustness tests that we run for alternative crisis years (2007-
2008 and 2007-2009). 
In the construction of our empirical dataset, we exclude following sectors: 
banking, financial intermediation, mutual funds, holding financial companies and 
insurance, education, public sector and defence, social insurance as well as publicly 
owned companies. Next, the data set was cleaned from outliers as regarding to: 1) 
the firms with 0 HRK value of assets, sales, cash balances or employees, 2) the firms 
with sales, depreciation and debt to assets ratios higher than 99th percentile, 3) the 
firms where cash flow to assets ratio, investment, sales growth, value added to asset 
ratio, ROA, current ratio and debt ratio are lower than 1th or higher than 99th 
percentile, 4) the firms with missing observations and the inactive firms. 
These exclusions reduce the heterogeneity of the sample and make the 
implications of our analysis more reliable. After these adjustments, our baseline 
specification (period from 2007-2010) consists of 18.235 observations for the 
investment equation and 31.137 for the employment equation. We first make the 
balanced panel from 2007 to 2010 and then we use the data on investment and 
employment from 2007 and 2010 to construct our dependent variable: log change 
in investment (employment). The statistical summary of our data set is provided in the 
Appendix (Table A8). 
The aim of our analysis is to compare firm´s behaviour of investment and 
employment in relation to different levels of leverage and liquidity. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of debt to total assets (debt ratio) where we define three 
categories of leverage, namely low-leverage firms (up to 33th percentile), medium-
leverage (between 33th and 66th percentile) and high-leverage (above 66th 
percentile). The liquidity is measured by current ratio (short-term asset/short-term 
liabilities). Similarly, there are three groups of firms: low-liquid firms (up to 33th 
percentile), medium-liquid (between 33th and 66th percentile) and high-liquid 
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The main variables of our interest are the investment and employment. We define 
investment as a nett difference of depreciation augmented tangible assets (MI) in 
the current period and nett tangible assets in the previous period, it = (MIt + At) −
MIt−1. As a robustness check, the alternative measure from Croatian Bureau of 
statistics is used as a measure of investment, namely the investment in new long-term 
assets. Employment is equal to the log of number of employees or total hours worked 
in the each firm. 
Our empirical model includes the vector of control variables typically found in 
investment models. The first one is the cash flow rate 𝑐𝑓𝑡 and it is intended to proxy for 
the firm`s nett value. The cash flow is defined as a sum of pre interest and tax profits 
and depreciation. The second control that we include in our model is the new value 
added rate 𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑡. The new value added controls for the general output effect on the 
firm level and we calculate it as a sum of pre-tax, interest and employee 
expenditure earnings. The third variable we include in our vector of controls is the 
depreciation rate 𝑑𝑟𝑡 and is defined as the ratio of depreciation and total assets in 
the previous period. The last control variable is the return on assets 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑡 and is 
defined as the ratio of gross earnings and the price-corrected total assets. To control 
for the differences in industries and counties, we include county (𝐶𝑐 , 𝑐 = 1, . .21) and 
industry (𝑆𝑠, 𝑠 = 1, … ,18) dummies in our empirical specification as well. This accounts 
for the potential heterogeneities related to the type of business and geographical 
factors of the sample. We use industry classification given by National industry 
classification (18 industries all together). 
Next, we provide descriptive analysis of variables used in the analysis. Balance 
sheet recession implies the positive feedback loop between debt and business 
investment in a boom phase of the business cycle and the asymmetric responses to 
the negative shock (recessions) due to the different firm indebtedness. 
Consequently, to get an impression of the aggregate debt and investment 
dynamics, we present a time period (2000-2014) which is longer than in our empirical 
model on the Figures 1 and 2. Several definitions of investment (i.e. investment 
variables) are used in this paper. The first one is investment cash flow obtained from 
the cash flow accounts. This variable represents both real and financial investment. 
Second variable is gross capital formation derived from Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 
The third variable is the nett investment and represents the nett tangible assets 
change 𝑀𝐼𝑡 − 𝑀𝐼𝑡−1. 
All three variables show similar dynamics and statistical properties (Figure 1). All 
measures of aggregate investment in Croatia exhibit typical boom and bust 
behaviour, which can be seen on the Figure 1. The investment increased from 23 
billion HRK in 2001 to 69 billion in 2007, which is CAGR of 20%. After the financial crisis, 
investment decreased continuously to the level of 25 billion HRK in 2014, which is a 
slump of 62.88%. Gross capital formation and investment flow shows a smaller 
decrease (53% and 57% in period 2008-2014), but the pattern is similar. 
Aggregate dynamics of capital structure for the period 2000-2014 is shown in the 
Figure 2. The boom phase of the business cycle (2000-2007) is characterized by the 
increase in aggregate financial leverage. The structure of debt has changed over 
time as well. While short–term debt is relatively constant in the pre-crisis period, long-
term debt increases significantly. As a result, the debt ratio rose from 50% in 2000 to 
55% in 2007 and 60% in 2011. It is interesting to note that the debt ratio increased 
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Figure 1 Investment, gross capital formation, investment flow and net investment of 
non-financial firms in period 2001-2014, in billions HRK; the period between the two 
(dotted) lines is used in our empirical model since the crisis was most intense during 
that time 
Source: FINA, author’s calculation. 
 
 
Figure 2 Capital structure dynamics from 2000 to 2014; the period between the 
two (dotted) lines is used in our empirical model since the crisis was most intense 
during that time 
Source: FINA, author’s calculation. 
 
It is important to mention that the short- and long-term debt includes liabilities to 
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ratio is adjusted in a way that liabilities to related parties are subtracted from debt 
and added to capital, the dynamics of debt ratio looks different. This adjusted debt 
ratio is mainly unchanged from 2008 to 2014, which means that the whole increase in 
the debt ratio from 2008-2014 is due to the rise in labilities to related parties. This 
might imply the problem in firm´s access to finance and financial constraint. 
Continuing our descriptive analysis, we split the sample by lag debt ratio, lag 
current ratio, lag value added ratio and lag cash flow ratio. First group (“Low”) 
includes firms, which has lag debt ratio to 33th percentile; second group (“Middle”) 
includes firms from 33th to 66th percentile and third group above 66th percentile. For 
every group we calculate the median of investment. The same procedure for other 
variables was used. We note that the percentile thresholds are imposed exogenously 
(not generated from a pre-specified or data-driven approach) and are chosen so 
that they follow best practices in the literature (see Tarrasow, 2015; Kuchler, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 3 Median of investment ratio dynamics for different groups of firms from 
2001 to 2014 
Source: FINA, author’s calculation. 
 
All graphs in the Figure 3 show decline in investment for all groups and variables. 
The first graph on the Figure 3 shows that illiquid firms invest less than middle and 
high-liquid firms. Even larger difference between median of investment across 
groups is visible on second graph. Firms with high debt ratio (above 66th percentile) 
have smaller investment ratio than other two groups. It is interesting to note that 
median of investment for “high” group shows negative trend and settled at 0 in 2009. 
Firms with “low” leverage invest more than with “middle” leveraged firms, but 
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role of the debt, meaning that it is an important source of financing on one side and 
a generator of higher risk on another side. 
Last two graphs show median of investment rates for variables that reflect 
demand side factors. There is a clear hierarchical structure in the investment 
behaviour. The firms with “low” cash flow and low value added rates have 0 
investment ratio throughout the whole period. The firms with “middle” level of cash 




In order to determine the effects of the leverage and the liquidity on the investment 
and the employment, the OLS estimator is applied to the following reduced form of 
the investment equation:  
∆𝑌𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,2007−2010 = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,2007 + 𝜃𝐻𝐻𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,2007 + 𝜃𝐷𝐻𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,2007 ∙ 𝐿𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,2007 + 𝛽𝑿𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,2007








where the subscripts refer to firm 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑖, industry 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑠, county 𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑐, the 
subscript 2007-2010 refers to the change over the respective period and 2007 
denotes stands for the value in the initial sample year. The depended variable 
(∆𝑌𝑖,𝑠,𝑐,2007−2010) represents the change of net investment for each firm i, industry s 
and county c, from 2007 to 2010. The change in the number of persons employed in 
each firm from 2007 to 2010 as the dependent variable was used as well. The 𝐿 and 
the 𝐻 are the balance sheet dummy variables denoting the debt and current ratio. 
Therefore, the 𝐿 and the 𝐻 refer to firms having low/high debt ratio, or low/high 
current ratio where the respective subscript 2007 refers to the value at the beginning 
of the period (i.e. year 2007). More precisely, the dummy variable 𝐿 is equal to one if 
a firm’s debt ratio or current ratio is inside 33th percentile (low-leverage and low-
liquid firms). The dummy variable 𝐻 is equal to one if a firm’s debt ratio or current 
ratio is above 66th percentile (high-leverage and high-liquid firms). The middle-
leverage or the middle-liquid group represents the base group. The estimated 
coefficients 𝜃𝐿 and 𝜃𝐻 contain the information about the difference in the change of 
investment rates (employment) between low and medium, and high and medium 
levered (or liquid) firms. Coefficient on interaction term θD, measures the average 
difference in change of investment rates between low-leverage-high-liquid firms 
relative to middle-leverage-middle-liquid (Wooldridge, 2010). The first summation 
sign, ∑ 𝜑𝑠𝑆𝑠
17
𝑠=1 , represents industry fixed effects. 
There are 18 industries in total, where agriculture represents the base industry. 
Second summation sign represents county fixed effects. There are totally 21 counties 
and Zagrebacka zupanija county represents the base county. Number of industries 
and counties are decreased by one due to the dummy variable trap. 
The Vector X includes the set of control variables: cash flow, new value added 
rate, depreciation rate, real sales growth and return on assets (see previous section 
for the discussion). All control variables, except Return of Assets (ROA) and real sales 
growth are normalized by total assets size for the sake of comparability. 
 
Results and implications 
The estimation results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The Table 1 shows the results 
where change in investment is used as the depended variable. The coefficients on 
low-leverage and high-leverage dummy variable measure the average difference 
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ratio between 0.50 and 0.76), and high-leverage (debt ratio > 0.76) and middle 
leverage firms respectively, holding other firm’s characteristics fixed. There are 6017 
middle, 6018 low and 6200 high leveraged firms retrospectively and 6019 middle, 
6017 low, 6199 high liquid firms. On average, decrease in investment for low-
leverage firms is11.3% higher than for middle-leverage (base group), while high-
leverage experience 7.64% lower change in investment (significant at 10% level). 
After including sector and county dummies (model 2), the coefficient on low-
leverage dummy is still significant at 10% level but the coefficient on high-leverage 
dummy becomes insignificant at 10% level. 
 
Table 1 Change in investment from 2007 to 2010 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Low-leverage 0.113*** 0.0983*   -0.160** 
 (0.0411) (0.0520)   (0.0651) 
High-leverage -0.0746* -0.0708   0.000765 
 (0.0415) (0.0434)   (0.0708) 
Low-liquidity   -0.234*** -0.237*** -0.260*** 
   (0.0416) (0.0298) (0.0412) 
High-liquidity   0.0351 0.0280 -0.164*** 
   (0.0412) (0.0433) (0.0497) 
L-lev*L-liq     0.252* 
     (0.121) 
L-lev* H-liq     0.378*** 
     (0.0684) 
H-lev*L-liq     -0.0192 
     (0.0602) 
H-lev*H-liq     0.119 
     (0.133) 
nva 0.0694* 0.0657 0.0776** 0.0695* 0.0672* 
 (0.0390) (0.0411) (0.0391) (0.0390) (0.0368) 
cfl 1.385*** 1.375** 1.494*** 1.463** 1.365** 
 (0.402) (0.525) (0.401) (0.542) (0.535) 
dr -2.912*** -2.969*** -2.785*** -2.897*** -2.730*** 
 (0.434) (0.574) (0.657) (0.606) (0.600) 
rsg -0.000162 -0.000119 -0.000161 -0.000108 -9.49e-05 
 (0.000176) (9.83e-05) (0.000175) (9.86e-05) (9.64e-05) 
roa -0.0146*** -0.0140*** -0.0160*** -0.0152*** -0.0146*** 
 (0.00331) (0.00426) (0.00331) (0.00448) (0.00436) 
Constant -0.778*** -0.480*** -0.717*** -0.399*** -0.372*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0532) (0.0409) (0.0583) (0.0592) 
      
Observations 18,235 18,235 18,235 18,235 18,235 
R-squared 0.006 0.013 0.008 0.015 0.015 
Industry effects  YES  YES YES 
County effects  YES  YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: FINA, authors own calculation. 
 
Coefficients on low- and high-liquidity, in columns (3) and (4) in the Table 1, 
measure the average difference of a change in investment between low-liquid 
(current ratio < 1.07) and a middle-liquid (current ratio between 1.08 and 1.80) firms, 
and high-liquid (current ratio > 1.81) and middle-liquid firms retrospectively, holding 
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liquid firms are 23% lower than the middle leverage firms on average (highly 
significant), while coefficient on high-levered firms is insignificant. The column (5) 
from the Table 1 includes the interaction terms between leverage and liquidity to 
estimate reaction of financially distressed firms. The results confirm the importance of 
the firm balance sheet channel: firms with weaker balance sheets experienced a 
larger drop in investment. For example, for the low-leverage-high-liquid firms change 
in investment is 5.8% higher on average, relative to middle-leverage-middle-liquid 
firms do. On the other side, high-leverage-low-liquid firms invest on average 28% less 
than middle-leverage-middle-liquid firms do. 
Overall, the results indicate that the medium and high leveraged firms reduced 
their investment more during the crisis than firms with low leverage did. The drop in 
investment is even stronger if we relate low-liquid and middle-liquid (or high-liquid) 
firms. 
 
Table 2 Change in employment from 2007 to 2010 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Low-leverage 0.0279*** 0.0213***   0.00807 
 (0.00624) (0.00394)   (0.0171) 
High-leverage -0.0314*** -0.0308***   -0.0101 
 (0.00690) (0.0104)   (0.00608) 
Low-liquidity   -0.0341*** -0.0326*** -0.0235 
   (0.00696) (0.00587) (0.0225) 
High-liquidity   0.0225*** 0.0162* 0.0159 
   (0.00634) (0.00778) (0.0109) 
L-lev*L-liq     0.00888 
     (0.0380) 
L-lev* H-liq     -0.000874 
     (0.0177) 
H-lev*L-liq     -0.00951 
     (0.0216) 
H-lev*H-liq     -0.0705*** 
     (0.0209) 
nva -0.0377*** -0.0448*** -0.0354*** -0.0434*** -0.0446*** 
 (0.00544) (0.0116) (0.00543) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
cfl 0.186** 0.181** 0.214*** 0.205** 0.179* 
 (0.0727) (0.0850) (0.0738) (0.0862) (0.0861) 
dr 0.162** 0.149* 0.153 0.145* 0.174** 
 (0.0760) (0.0790) (0.107) (0.0761) (0.0737) 
rsg 0.000219*** 0.000245*** 0.000209*** 0.000237*** 0.000249*** 
 (3.14e-05) (3.80e-05) (3.11e-05) (4.10e-05) (3.82e-05) 
roa 0.000785 0.000822 0.000549 0.000617 0.000748 
 (0.000592) (0.000575) (0.000603) (0.000590) (0.000585) 
Constant -0.154*** -0.120*** -0.155*** -0.118*** -0.116*** 
 (0.00585) (0.00877) (0.00641) (0.0126) (0.0145) 
      
Observations 31,137 31,137 31,137 31,137 31,137 
R-squared 0.021 0.035 0.021 0.035 0.036 
Industry effects  YES  YES YES 
County effects  YES  YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2 shows the results for the model that has a change in employment as a 
depended variable. The high-leverage and low-liquid firms have on average around 
3% lower change of employment then the baseline group (significant at 1% level). 
Again, the largest decline is characteristic for high-debt-low-liquid firms, around 4% 
lower than the baseline group. 
As a robustness test, we provide results for different definitions of investment and 
employment variable in the Table A1 and the Table A2 (see Appendix). We use the 
gross investment in new long-term assets on the firm level as a measure of 
investment, according to the definition in the national account statistics. The hours 
worked (on the firm level) is used as a measure of employment. In the Table A1 the 
direction of relationship between investment and balance sheet variables is the 
same for low liquid firms (around -21%), but lower for high debt firms (-4%, but 
insignificant). On the other hand, the results in the appendix Table A2 are almost the 
same as in the Table 2, which means that there is no difference in results when hours 
worked is used as a dependent variable compared to the number of employees. 
It is important to note that our results might suffer from a slight downward-bias due 
to the bankruptcy rate increase after the crisis, which affects our data. Namely, the 
firms that went bankrupt have not submitted annual reports after the crisis. For these 
firms, the decrease in employment and investment is equal to 100%. It is reasonable 
to expect that these firms belong to high-leveraged or low-liquid firms. Since they did 
not submit financial statements in 2010, they are not part of our analysis. 
To overcome this problem we also estimate changes in employment and 
investment for periods 2007-2009 and 2007-2008. The results are given in the Table A3 
and the Table A4. In the Table A3, the coefficients on balance sheet dummy 
variables have the same direction and similar magnitude as the coefficients in 
baseline model. The only difference comes from a somewhat lower coefficient on 
low-liquid dummy variable (-15%) and higher coefficients for high-liquid firms. Again, 
the highest drop in investment is present for high-leverage-low-liquid firms (-20%). The 
Table A4 shows the different results relative to the baseline model (2007-2010). There 
is no economically and statistically different employment adjustment behaviour 
among firms according to balance sheet variables. The reason for this is simple. 
Namely, the aggregate employment levels started to decrease in 2009 and even 
more in 2010, so that the effect of change in employment can be seen only after 
2009. 
As an additional robustness test, we estimate the equation (1) for pre-crisis periods 
2005-2006 and 2005-2007 to control for more general effects (other than crisis). The 
results are provided in the Table A3 (see Appendix). The coefficients on leverage 
and liquidity dummy variables exhibit the similar pattern before and during the crisis, 
which indicates that the frictions on capital markets may have also been present 
before the crisis. On the other side, there is no significant change in employment 
between high, middle and low-leverage (liquid) firms before crisis. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that there are investment balance sheet effects in all periods 
and employment balance sheet effects during the crisis. 
We also did standard diagnostic and specification checks. Table A9 shows high 
correlation between cash flow and return on assets, but there is no perfect 
multicollinearity problem. Removing roa from specification changes somewhat 
coefficients on cash flows and new value added (they become insignificant) but this 
doesn’t change the significance of coefficients on dummy variables. We use robust 
standard errors in our empirical specification to control for heteroscedasticity, so 
there is no need to conduct heteroscedasticity test. Outliers are removed by 
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Shapiro-Wilk (table A10). It shows that our residuals are not normally distributed (the 
peak of the distribution is higher). But, as Lumley and Emerson (2002) shows, for large 
samples, t-test and linear regression coefficients are valid for any distribution. 
The results have implications for economic policy. They indicate that firms respond 
to economic shocks in a heterogeneous way which potentially causes protracted 
recessions and changes the structure of economy. As a reaction to the economic 
crisis, firms first tighten their investment which is especially the case with highly 
indebted and exposed businesses. These firms also reduce the employment and add 
additional pressure to the overall economy creating a negative feedback loops that 
might further inhibit the economic recovery. This might destroy the equilibrium and 
lower the steady state of the economy. Policy makers could respond with debt write 
offs and by offering alternative credit lines (i.e. source of financing). The debt write-
offs are therefore expected to have positive effects on employment and shorten the 
recession. This might be a way to deal with recessions without directly burdening the 
public finances. Easier access to financing would be especially beneficial to smaller 
firms and policy makers should provide options for financial inclusion and/or other 
crediting channels. The policy makers should also consider labour market regulation 
that preserves employment throughout the period of crisis. Namely, shorter working 
hours and performance adjusted tax could be considered. 
 
Conclusions 
Economic literature recognizes the firm`s balance sheet channel as an important 
propagator of macroeconomic shocks. This stands somewhat in contrast to the 
neoclassical theory of investment which assumes perfect capital markets. Firms react 
heterogeneously to the crisis due to different financial positions. This shows the 
importance of financial frictions in amplification of negative shocks. This paper 
analyses the firm’s reaction to economic crisis in general and their investment as well 
as employment decisions in particular. We make use of high-quality, firm level data 
where almost the whole population of Croatian firms is available for analysis. After 
the data set adjustments to solve the outlier problems, we are left with 18.235 and 
31.137 observations in our empirical sample, depending on the preferred choice of 
variables. Therefore, we apply simple but powerful OLS estimator where the model 
can differentiate between the high, medium and low leveraged firms. The model is 
augmented with a set of commonly used controls as well as county and industry 
dummies. Unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for with these effects. We run 
different robustness tests and are able to interpret the results with significant amount 
of certainty. 
There is evidence that confirms the importance of the firm`s balance sheet 
channel. Namely, the medium and high leveraged firms reduce their investment 
during the crisis more than the firms with low leveraged balance sheet. On average, 
high-leverage firms experience 7.64% lower change in investment. The evidence is 
even stronger for low-liquid firms when compared to high-debt firms. The results show 
that change in investment for low-liquid firms are 23% lower than the middle 
leverage firms on average. 
This results point to the difference between financial and liquidity constraints, 
which can serve as a foundation for future theoretical research that emphasizes 
financial constraints. This finding also holds when the employment is used as a 
dependent variable and is supported by various additional robustness tests (various 
time periods, different dependent variables, various independent variables). The 
analysis has implications for economic policy, especially policies that decrease firm´s 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 Description of variables used in the analysis 
Variable name Abbreviation Short Description 
Investment i nett difference of depreciation augmented 
tangible assets 
Employment e number of employees or total hours worked 
within a firm 
Cash flow cf sum of pre interest and tax profits and 
depreciation 
New value added  nva sum of pre-tax, interest and employee 
expenditure earnings 
Depreciation rate dr ratio of depreciation and lagged total assets  
Return on assets roa ratio of gross earnings and the price-corrected 
total assets 
Current ratio cr Ratio of current assets and short –term liabilities 
Leverage Lev Ratio of total debt and total assets 
Revenue growth Rsg Deflated revenue growth rate  
 
Table A2 Change in investment in new long-term assets from 2007 to 2010 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Low-leverage 0.132*** 0.129**   -0.122 
 (0.0485) (0.0459)   (0.0925) 
High-leverage -0.0486 -0.0496   0.0373 
 (0.0492) (0.0452)   (0.0714) 
Low-liquidity   -0.213*** -0.217*** -0.233*** 
   (0.0491) (0.0569) (0.0721) 
High-liquidity   0.0576 0.0596 -0.116 
   (0.0487) (0.0681) (0.0877) 
L-lev*L-liq     0.293* 
     (0.151) 
L-lev* H-liq     0.339** 
     (0.135) 
H-lev*L-liq     -0.0492 
     (0.0927) 
H-lev*H-liq     0.106 
     (0.155) 
nva 0.315*** 0.317*** 0.331*** 0.320*** 0.319*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0418) (0.0452) (0.0430) (0.0407) 
cfl 1.156* 1.158* 1.215** 1.249** 1.172* 
 (0.598) (0.569) (0.596) (0.559) (0.566) 
dr -2.692*** -2.681*** -4.269*** -2.637*** -2.500*** 
 (0.618) (0.577) (0.857) (0.534) (0.539) 
rsg -0.00064*** -0.00062*** -0.00061** -0.00056** -0.00054** 
 (0.000244) (0.000201) (0.000245) (0.000193) (0.000204) 
roa -0.0144*** -0.0143*** -0.0155*** -0.0156*** -0.0152*** 
 (0.00482) (0.00385) (0.00482) (0.00390) (0.00394) 
Constant -0.801*** -0.531*** -0.667*** -0.452*** -0.448*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0908) (0.0497) (0.0877) (0.108) 
      
N 8,979 8,979 8,979 8,979 8,979 
R-squared 0.011 0.017 0.014 0.019 0.020 
Industry effects  YES  YES YES 
County effects  YES  YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A3 Change in hours worked from 2007 to 2010 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Low-leverage 0.0230*** 0.0169***   0.0111 
 (0.00605) (0.00530)   (0.0161) 
High-leverage -0.0309*** -0.0305**   -0.0141 
 (0.00672) (0.0109)   (0.00956) 
Low-liquidity   -0.0302*** -0.0293*** -0.0187 
   (0.00678) (0.00563) (0.0189) 
High-liquidity   0.0206*** 0.0152** 0.0161** 
   (0.00617) (0.00580) (0.00573) 
L-lev*L-liq     -0.00679 
     (0.0314) 
L-lev* H-liq     -0.00798 
     (0.0148) 
H-lev*L-liq     -0.00742 
     (0.0156) 
H-lev*H-liq     -0.0526** 
     (0.0236) 
nva -0.0399*** -0.0464*** -0.0380*** -0.0451*** -0.0462*** 
 (0.00522) (0.00853) (0.00521) (0.00840) (0.00825) 
cfl 0.151** 0.146 0.177** 0.168* 0.145 
 (0.0685) (0.0917) (0.0694) (0.0931) (0.0935) 
dr 0.234*** 0.219** 0.289*** 0.216** 0.238*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0824) (0.103) (0.0783) (0.0791) 
rsg 0.000240*** 0.000266*** 0.000232*** 0.000258*** 0.000270*** 
 (3.01e-05) (2.91e-05) (2.99e-05) (3.21e-05) (2.94e-05) 
roa 0.000997* 0.00106 0.000772 0.000872 0.000983 
 (0.000561) (0.000666) (0.000570) (0.000681) (0.000678) 
Constant -0.145*** -0.112*** -0.150*** -0.112*** -0.109*** 
 (0.00568) (0.0101) (0.00625) (0.0151) (0.0150) 
      
N 31,138 31,138 31,138 31,138 31,138 
R-squared 0.022 0.036 0.022 0.035 0.036 
Industry effects  YES  YES YES 
County effects  YES  YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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L-leverage 0.0597  -0.248*** 0.115**  -0.178*** 
 (0.0439)  (0.0563) (0.0438)  (0.0385) 
H-leverage -0.0831**  -0.0188 -0.0735*  -0.0142 
 (0.0319)  (0.0558) (0.0380)  (0.0406) 
L-liquidity  -0.154*** -0.187***  -0.140*** -0.134*** 
  (0.0304) (0.0341)  (0.0259) (0.0317) 
H-liquidity  0.0869** -0.0435  0.0973* -0.118* 
  (0.0322) (0.0633)  (0.0485) (0.0657) 
L-lev*L-liq   0.228***   0.201*** 
   (0.0729)   (0.0631) 
L-lev* H-liq   0.377***   0.426*** 
   (0.0557)   (0.0537) 
H-lev*L-liq   -0.00386   -0.0545** 
   (0.0598)   (0.0253) 
H-lev*H-liq   -0.0729   0.0712 
   (0.166)   (0.0731) 
nva 0.0354 0.0428* 0.0388 0.0975*** 0.104*** 0.0996*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0243) (0.0252) (0.0258) (0.0247) (0.0254) 
cfl 0.834*** 0.894*** 0.825*** 1.733*** 1.853*** 1.726*** 
 (0.274) (0.289) (0.278) (0.303) (0.302) (0.315) 
dr -2.245*** -2.180*** -2.034*** -3.514*** -3.533*** -3.329*** 
 (0.411) (0.423) (0.423) (0.367) (0.381) (0.388) 
rsg -7.23e-05 -5.77e-05 -4.41e-05 2.13e-05 1.11e-05 4.19e-05 
 (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00010) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018) 
roa -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (0.00190) (0.00197) (0.00187) (0.00236) (0.00247) (0.00254) 
Constant 0.275*** 0.293*** 0.341*** -0.170*** -0.141** -0.106** 
 (0.0415) (0.0468) (0.0352) (0.0330) (0.0506) (0.0462) 
       
N 17,698 17,698 17,698 17,698 17,698 17,698 
R-squared 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.015 0.016 0.017 
Industry eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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L-leverage -0.0084***  -0.00859 0.00618**  -0.000427 
 (0.00269)  (0.00672) (0.00267)  (0.0147) 
H-leverage 0.00500**  0.00476 -0.00881  -0.00477 
 (0.00233)  (0.00380) (0.00672)  (0.00984) 
L-liquidity  -0.0079** -0.0143***  -0.0103** -0.00808 
  (0.00341) (0.00427)  (0.00420) (0.00989) 
H-liquidity  -0.0136*** -0.0127*  0.00366 -0.00249 
  (0.00332) (0.00631)  (0.00466) (0.00491) 
L-lev*L-liq   0.00121   -0.00392 
   (0.0177)   (0.0340) 
L-lev* H-liq   0.00642   0.00908 
   (0.00852)   (0.0109) 
H-lev*L-liq   0.00600   -0.00086 
   (0.00400)   (0.00591) 
H-lev*H-liq   0.00257   -0.0155 
   (0.0163)   (0.0206) 
nva -0.0151*** -0.0156*** -0.0154*** -0.0364*** -0.0360*** -0.0367*** 
 (0.00327) (0.00326) (0.00316) (0.00803) (0.00802) (0.00776) 
cfl -0.00245 -0.0102 -0.00355 0.128** 0.135** 0.125** 
 (0.0310) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0525) (0.0518) (0.0528) 
dr 0.155*** 0.167*** 0.164*** 0.104 0.102 0.115 
 (0.0278) (0.0280) (0.0254) (0.0729) (0.0691) (0.0683) 
rsg 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
roa 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.00079** 0.00073** 0.00078** 
 (0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00034) (0.00029) (0.00029) (0.00029) 
Constant -0.0231** -0.0171* -0.0170** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.051*** 
 (0.00853) (0.00910) (0.00793) (0.00912) (0.0122) (0.0109) 
       
N 31,881 31,881 31,881 31,881 31,881 31,881 
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.024 0.024 0.024 
Industry eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A6 Change in investment for periods 2005-2006 and 2005-2007 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2005-06 2005-06 2005-06 2005-07 2005-07 2005-07 
       
L-leverage 0.0942***  -0.141*** 0.121***  -0.221*** 
 (0.0208)  (0.0472) (0.0250)  (0.0675) 
H-leverage -0.0597*  0.0922** -0.0609***  -0.00897 
 (0.0282)  (0.0408) (0.0160)  (0.0370) 
L-liquidity  -0.243*** -0.237***  -0.222*** -0.304*** 
  (0.0208) (0.0506)  (0.0265) (0.0689) 
H-liquidity  0.0246 -0.0623*  0.0610*** -0.139** 
  (0.0214) (0.0332)  (0.0148) (0.0516) 
L-lev*L-liq   0.111   0.358** 
   (0.0856)   (0.125) 
L-lev* H-liq   0.291***   0.447*** 
   (0.0630)   (0.0978) 
H-lev*L-liq   -0.0969   0.0512 
   (0.0703)   (0.0774) 
H-lev*H-liq   -0.321**   -0.0189 
   (0.128)   (0.0974) 
nva 0.0965*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.213*** 0.221*** 0.219*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0243) (0.0263) (0.0298) (0.0321) (0.0325) 
cfl 0.259 0.293 0.219 0.607*** 0.660*** 0.572*** 
 (0.249) (0.255) (0.250) (0.148) (0.158) (0.154) 
dr -1.933*** -1.770*** -1.603*** -2.364*** -2.228*** -2.044*** 
 (0.161) (0.170) (0.180) (0.135) (0.144) (0.154) 
rsg 0.00034** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.000142 0.000174* 0.00019** 
 (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009) 
roa -0.00337 -0.00430* -0.00397 -0.0086*** -0.0097*** -0.0093*** 
 (0.00246) (0.00238) (0.00230) (0.00154) (0.00152) (0.00145) 
Constant -0.0632 0.00289 -0.00638 0.0373 0.0915* 0.128** 
 (0.0394) (0.0409) (0.0410) (0.0470) (0.0479) (0.0477) 
       
N 17,254 17,254 17,254 17,254 17,254 17,254 
R-squared 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.018 
Industry eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A7 Change in employment for periods 2005-2006 and 2005-2007 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2005-06 2005-06 2005-06 2005-07 2005-07 2005-07 
       
L-leverage -0.0113***  -0.0139* -0.0192***  -0.0244*** 
 (0.00173)  (0.00702) (0.00367)  (0.00803) 
H-leverage 0.00612**  0.00763 0.000543  -0.000794 
 (0.00236)  (0.00443) (0.00254)  (0.00396) 
L-liquidity  -0.000587 -0.00408  0.00105 -0.00518 
  (0.00212) (0.00796)  (0.00341) (0.00754) 
H-liquidity  -0.0047*** 0.00549  -0.00440 0.0118* 
  (0.00153) (0.00345)  (0.00275) (0.00621) 
L-lev*L-liq   0.00141   0.00154 
   (0.0188)   (0.0157) 
L-lev* H-liq   -0.00179   -0.00338 
   (0.00777)   (0.0107) 
H-lev*L-liq   2.61e-05   0.00735 
   (0.0101)   (0.00727) 
H-lev*H-liq   0.00774   -0.00272 
   (0.0114)   (0.00902) 
nva -0.0265*** -0.0274*** -0.0262*** -0.0443*** -0.0454*** -0.0442*** 
 (0.00577) (0.00578) (0.00579) (0.00875) (0.00892) (0.00873) 
cfl 0.0384* 0.0260 0.0406* 0.0506 0.0359 0.0514 
 (0.0214) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0496) (0.0493) (0.0485) 
dr 0.116*** 0.132*** 0.118*** 0.176*** 0.194*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0191) (0.0179) (0.0445) (0.0454) (0.0431) 
rsg 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
roa 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 0.0009*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 
 (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00033) (0.00049) (0.00048) (0.00048) 
Constant -0.000678 0.000676 -0.000915 -0.000112 -0.00335 -0.000896 
 (0.00299) (0.00334) (0.00412) (0.00406) (0.00578) (0.00539) 
       
N 28,876 28,876 28,876 28,876 28,876 28,876 
R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.030 0.029 0.030 
Industry eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: FINA, authors’ own calculation. 
 
Table A8 Summary statistics 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
N mean sd min max 
employ 18,235 23.10 132.0 1 10,752 
cfl 18,235 0.223 0.218 0.00213 1.807 
i 18,235 0.189 0.527 4.70e-08 37.86 
dr 18,235 0.0860 0.0825 0 0.487 
rsg 18,235 28.93 100.6 -70.70 1,567 
roa 18,235 15.09 23.55 -22.43 151.0 
nva 18,235 0.594 0.565 0.0151 3.871 
ten 18,235 0.622 0.274 0.00553 2.005 
cr 18,235 2.017 2.073 0.110 17.99 
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Table A9 Variance inflation factor multicollinearity test (1/VIF) and Shapiro-Wilk test 
Variables Table 1 (5) Table 2 (5) Table A2 (5) Table A4 (5) Table A5 (3) 
A. VIF      
L-leverage 0.1794 0.1708 0.1851 0.1795 0.1689 
H-leverage 0.2823 0.2839 0.2788 0.2801 0.2846 
L-liquidity 0.2624 0.2625 0.2606 0.2602 0.2634 
H-liquidity 0.2049 0.1991 0.2074 0.2050 0.1968 
L-lev*L-liq 0.5370 0.5348 0.5374 0.5278 0.5346 
L-lev* H-liq 0.1163 0.1103 0.1198 0.1166 0.1088 
H-lev*L-liq 0.1888 0.1868 0.1852 0.1861 0.1874 
H-lev*H-liq 0.5854 0.5906 0.5771 0.5744 0.5866 
nva 0.5556 0.6099 0.5154 0.5486 0.6119 
cfl 0.0365 0.0488 0.0389 0.0399 0.0479 
dr 0.2120 0.2703 0.2338 0.2351 0.2670 
rsg 0.9176 0.9302 0.9241 0.9133 0.9278 
roa 0.0463 0.0618 0.0477 0.0505 0.0609 
 
 
Table A10 Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of residuals 
Specification Observations W V Shapiro-Wilk 
Table 1 (5) 18.235 0.9842 130.697 0.00 
Table 2 (5) 31.137 0.9734 339.39 0.00 
Table A2 (5) 8.979 0.9871 58.12 0.00 
Table A4 (3) 17.698 0.9876 99.96 0.00 
Table A5 (3) 31.881 0.8549 1891.13 0.00 
 
